Europe is at a crossroads. The high-water mark of trans-Atlantic security cooperation is behind us, and the Trump administration regards most of Europe with a combination of contempt, disdain, or outright hostility. At a minimum, Europe’s leaders can no longer take U.S. support and protection for granted. They can hope for the best, but they must plan for the worst. And that means charting an independent course in world politics.

To be fair, this situation isn’t entirely President Donald Trump’s fault. Even if he had never been elected, a fundamental rebalancing of trans-Atlantic relations was long overdue. A glance at a globe tells you why: The United States is not a European power, and a permanent U.S. military commitment there is a historical and geopolitical anomaly. A costly commitment of this sort can only be justified by clear strategic necessity, such as the desire to prevent any single power from dominating the entire region. This strategic objective is the main reason the United States entered World War I and World War II and why it kept substantial forces in Europe during the Cold War.

These policies made good sense back then, but the Cold War has been over for more than 30 years, and the unipolar moment ended some years ago, too. China is now America’s main great-power rival and a potential regional hegemon, and the United States needs to focus its finite resources and energies on preventing Chinese hegemony in Asia. The good news is that no country is powerful enough to dominate Europe today—not even Russia—which means the United States no longer needs to shoulder that burden. Europe has more than three times Russia’s population, nine times its GDP, and NATO’s European members outspend Russia on defense, too, albeit they don’t spend that money very efficiently. If its greater latent power were properly mobilized, Europe could deter or defeat a direct Russian challenge without a lot of direct help from Uncle Sam.

Ideally, the United States should be working with Europe to negotiate a new division of labor, to make this transition as smooth and efficient as possible. The upcoming NATO summit in June will be an ideal opportunity to accelerate that process, especially if the United States chooses to play a constructive role.

Unfortunately, the Trump administration does not think Europe is a valuable economic partner or a useful strategic ally. At the risk of overstatement, it sees Europe as a set of decadent, divided, and declining states committed to liberal values that Trump and the MAGA movement reject. Trump is more comfortable with autocrats like Russian President Vladimir Putin or Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban than with mainstream European politicians, and the administration is more sympathetic to far-right groups such as the AfD in Germany or Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France. Trump supported Brexit, believes the European Union was formed in order to “screw the United States,” and would prefer to deal one on one with individual European countries than with EU officials representing Europe as a whole. He rejects norms or rules that might interfere with his dreams of annexing Greenland or making Canada part of the United States. And by including Europe in his tariff war, he’s making it harder for Europe to meet the defense spending targets that Trump supposedly wants.

All this is worrisome enough from a European perspective, but Europe’s leaders also need to come to terms with the Trump administration’s innate incompetence. The chaotic trade war is the clearest example of this problem, but let’s not forget the administration’s unqualified appointees, the embarrassing Signalgate debacle, the ongoing attacks on the scientific establishment and universities, the amateurish negotiations with Russia and Iran, and the recurring disarray emanating from the office of the secretary of defense. If European leaders are accustomed to following America’s lead because they think Americans know what they’re doing, it’s time to think again.

So what should they do?

Europeans are free to ignore my advice, of course, but if I were in their position I’d start by placing the onus for the current troubles squarely on Washington. They should emphasize that they have no desire to quarrel with the United States and would be happy to negotiate new security and economic arrangements in a cooperative spirit. But if Washington insists on picking a fight, they should make it clear that they are ready to go to the mattresses to protect Europe’s interests.

Second, if Europeans must contend with an unfriendly U.S. administration, they are far better off speaking with one voice and resisting U.S. efforts to divide them. Europe should implement most of the economic reforms recommended in the recent Draghi report, and eliminate the veto that allows dissident member states to block necessary actions. If this leads contrarian states such as Hungary to opt out of the union, the remaining states might well be better off.

Third, great-power politics is back, and Europe needs more hard power. It is less a question of increased defense budgets (though some European states do need to spend more) and more a question of spending euros effectively and creating sustainable battlefield capacity that does not depend on a lot of U.S. help. Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis’s goal of “Four Thirties” (30 battalions, 30 air squadrons, 30 ships, available in 30 days) is a good place to start, but a credible European force that is not dependent on a lot of U.S. help will require more than that. And as Barry Posen recently warned in Foreign Affairs, Europe should avoid being drawn into a costly peacekeeping role in a postwar Ukraine and concentrate instead on developing a robust combined arms capability that can intervene wherever it is needed.

Fourth, because America’s nuclear umbrella looks increasingly unreliable, it is time for Europeans to have a serious and sustained discussion on the role of nuclear weapons in regional security. How Europeans answer that question is up to them, of course, but it can’t be ignored any longer. My own view is that a credible European deterrent does not require matching the U.S. or Russian arsenals, because its primary purpose is to dissuade a large-scale attack on the independence of key European states, and all that requires is a survivable second-strike capability. The good news is that European officials and strategic experts are beginning to discuss these issues, which is all to the good.

Fifth, European states need to remind Washington that they have options, and that they will work with others—including China—if the United States continues to be hostile or unreliable. Although the EU has its own concerns about trade with China, preserving and possibly expanding economic ties with Beijing may be necessary if Trump insists on raising tariff walls in the United States. For this reason, it makes good sense for EU leaders to be visiting Beijing in July, if only to remind Washington not to take them for granted.

European states have previously been willing to follow the U.S. lead in critical areas of advanced technology, even when doing so involved significant costs. The Netherlands accommodated the Biden administration by barring ASML (a Dutch firm) from selling advanced lithography machines to China, for example, and a number of EU countries decided to ban Huawei 5G technology even though it was cheaper and better than the alternatives. If the Trump administration insists on playing hardball with Europe on other issues, however, Europe should be much less receptive to future requests of this sort.

Finally, over the longer term, European countries should explore ways to lower the temperature with Russia. This will not be easy, especially if Putin still rules in Russia, but the current state of deep mutual suspicion, confrontation, and disruption is not in Europe’s interest. As their hard power increases and their security improves, the nations of Europe should remain open to confidence-building measures intended to address each side’s legitimate security concerns. Past initiatives such as the Helsinki process and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe remind us that détente is possible even among rivals, and future European leaders should remain open to this possibility.

This is an ambitious agenda and will face significant political obstacles. Past efforts to promote greater European strategic autonomy have always fallen short, but Europe faces a very different situation today. As universities and law firms in the United States have learned, trying to appease the Trump administration merely invites more demands; standing up to it encourages others to follow suit and sometimes causes the White House to reconsider its position. One hopes that will be the case now. In any case, if Europe wants to preserve its independence and minimize its vulnerabilities, it has little choice but to prepare for a world where the United States is no longer a reliable partner. Hope for the best; plan for the worst.